This article seems on the surface to be a rip off of the fantastic article in the Yale Journal of International Affairs. I thought it was somewhat interesting and will let you decide if indeed they have.
As the threat to forward-deployed U.S. forces grows, particularly in East Asia, the Pentagon has been pursuing a strategy known as Air-Sea Battle. As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Welsh have outlined here in FP, the goal is to neutralize the ability of enemies to keep U.S. forces at bay with so-called anti-access and area-denial defenses.
But while the proponents of Air-Sea Battle are careful to say that the strategy isn’t focused on one specific adversary, we shouldn’t kid ourselves: The Chinese see it as aimed at them. Then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said as much in the 2012 defense strategic guidance: “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities…. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.”
To do that, according to Air-Sea Battle, U.S. forces would launch physical attacks and cyberattacks against the enemy’s “kill-chain” of sensors and weaponry in order to disrupt its command-and-control systems, wreck its launch platforms (including aircraft, ships, and missile sites), and finally defeat the weapons they actually fire. The sooner the kill-chain is broken, the less damage U.S. forces will suffer — and the more damage they will be able to inflict on the enemy. Therein lies both the military attractiveness and the strategic risk of Air-Sea Battle.
Air-Sea Battle proponents are right to highlight the growing vulnerability of forward-deployed U.S. forces and right to enhance inter-service collaboration. But civilian and military leaders alike need to understand that Air-Sea Battle suggests the United States would strike China before China strikes U.S. forces. That could precipitate a spiraling, costly, and destabilizing arms race and make a crisis more likely to lead to hostilities. The United States needs options to facilitate crisis management, deter aggression, and protect U.S. forces that do not require early attacks on Chinese territory.
Here we suggest two: Shift toward a more survivable force posture in East Asia and improve the means to prevent China — or any state — from projecting force in an act of international aggression.
Akin to the Air-Land Battle plan of the 1980s — meant to thwart Soviet aggression against NATO — Air-Sea Battle responds to the declining viability of forward defense, combined with an aversion to nuclear escalation. As then, Air-Sea Battle is a joint effort by two services to align their capabilities and war plans to defeat a serious threat from a powerful adversary. (Then it was the Army and Air Force, now the Navy and Air Force.) And like Air-Land Battle, there is more to Air-Sea Battle than inter-service collaboration: namely a focus on deep, early strikes against enemy forces, infrastructure, command and control, and territory — then Soviet, now Chinese.
For more see my other post on war with China or please check out the article linked below. I tie it together with the PNAC report and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but the Yale author does not go back as far as I was willing to do so.
update Aug 15, 2013
Interesting article on Chinese Propaganda
The recent unveiling of China’s new PSYOP (Psychological Operations) aircraft, the Gaoxin-7(高新七号), marks an important step forward for People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) psychological warfare capabilities.
Based on a Y-8 airframe (similar to the U.S. Military’s C-130), the Gaoxin-7’s primary mission is to conduct PSYOP missions against enemy forces. Although specific details are few and far between, People’s Republic of China (PRC) media has compared the Gaoxin-7 to the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) EC-130J “Commando Solo” in terms of its mission and capability. The EC-130J Commando Solo is essentially a flying broadcast station which can transmit media in AM, FM, HF, TV and military communication frequencies to enemy positions. Its transmission capability is so powerful that it is required to operate at least 200 miles off the coast of the United States during training missions so as to avoid interfering with civil communications.
PSYOP has had an important role in numerous U.S. Military operations and Chinese military planners have paid close attention to these developments. The EC-130J Commando Solo has also played a central part in these operations. In Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Commando Solo was used broadcasted messages in Arabic which urged Iraqi soldiers to surrender. In both conflicts, large numbers of Iraqi troops surrendered to coalition forces without fighting. More recently, Commando Solo participated in the Libyan Air War and broadcasted messages which urged Libyan soldiers to avoid fighting and return to their homes.